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CHAPTER 1 
Proprietary Interest: Merchants, journalists 
. ' 
and Anti monopoly in the 1880s 
Richard R. John 
"Many good people have imagined a bogey monster that doesn't exist. They 
have accepted as facts the fancies of sensational journalism." So declared 
business lobbyist Francis B. Thurber in December 1899 in the Journal of So-
cial Science, in deploring popular hostility toward Standard Oil, the Ameri-
can Sugar Refining Company, and other corporate behemoths.1 Journalists 
were wrong 1:D demonize these giant organizations, Thurber warned, by 
conjuring up the "bogey monster" of monopoly. In fact, these giant organ-
izations had a "right to combine"-subj·ect to a «due reoard to the ricrhts of 0 0 
others" -since, as history demonstrated, economic consolidation would 
lqwer prices and increase output, making it a boon for the consumer.2 
Thurber's exasperation With the popular press was rooted in his conviction 
that irresponsible journalists were fueling a wrongheaded legal crusade to 
criminalize the economically sound, well-intentioned, and morally praise-
worthy mergers and acquisitions that had been undertaken recently by some 
of the country's largest and most powerful corporations. To check corporate 
abuse, Congress had in 1890 enacted a brief but sweeping law, known as 
the Sherman Act, which had made it a felony for anyone to monopolize, or 
even to "attempt to monopolize," any trade or form of commerce "among 
the several States, or with foreign nations."3 From Thurber's perspective, the 
Sherman Act was a travesty of justice that had plainly been inspired by a 
"wave of radical public opinion" that had originated among economically 
illiterate farmers and workers and that would be amplified by demagogic 
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politicians and a scurrilous "penny journalism." Even "our popular presi-
dent" Theodore Roosevelt, Thurber elaborated in 1905, was "liable to err in 
his impulses unless he studies this subject more deeply than he has as yet."4 
Thurber's lament is a pointed reminder of the complex tangle of interests 
and ideology that shaped the late nineteenth-century media campaign to 
regulate the conduct oflarge and powerful corporations. This media cam-
paign would reach its apotheosis in the decade immediately preceding the 
enactment of the Sherman Act and has come to be known to contemporaries 
and historians alike as "antimonopoly." This story is familiar to historians of 
the period, yet it has only rarely been subjected to critical scrutiny. This 
essay tries to set the record straight. 
It has long been conventional for historians-following, if unwittingly, 
obviously partisan corporate apologists like Thurber-to trace the late 
.nineteenth-century antimonopoly movement to the grievances of farmers 
and laborers outraged by the excesses of big business, making it, as it were, 
the latest installment in a perennial contest between the many and the few. 
This oft-told story is not entirely mistaken. Farm and labor publications had 
lambasted railroad corporations since at least the 1870s. Yet it is oversimpli-
fied and in certain factual details misleading. In fact, the antimonopoly 
movement that crested in the 1880s-the decade in which it loomed largest 
in public life-received its primary impetus not from farmers and work-
ers, but rather from some of the country's wealthiest and most influential 
merchants-the most vocal of whom were based in New York, Brooklyn, 
Chicago, and San Francisco-whose anticorporate, pro-proprietaryworldview 
was powerfully amplified by a small but influential cadre of reform-minded 
journalists. These merch~nts popularized a critique of corporate power that 
would shape American public life for decades to come. 
The wealthiest and most powerful merchants in the 1880s were not 
retailers (Sears would not build its first retail store until the 1920s), but, 
instead, wholesalers and shippers. Most merchants, including some of the 
wealthiest and most powerful, did not operate their businesses as state-
chartered corporations that managed other people's money. Instead, their 
businesses took.the-form of wholly owned proprietorships-often partner-
ships·with two or more principals-that had been organized under the com-
mon law. Historians sometimes assume that "big business" vanquished all 
comers in late nineteenth-century America. In reality, the ((incorporation" 
of America was slow and halting. Even Andrew Carnegie's vast steel empire · 
was organized not as a corporation. but as a proprietorship. The phrase "big 
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business" itself would not gain widespread currency until the twentieth 
century.5 The economic and moral superiority of the proprietorship over the 
corporation was a truism for well-educated Americans who reasoned, not 
implausibly, that proprietorships fostered autonomy while corporations bred 
dependency. This truism was also an article of faith for big-city merchants, 
who remained in the 1880s one of the nation's most tightly organized politi-
cal blocs. Corporations were obviously powerful, yet few assumed that their 
ascendancy was inevitable, while the proprietary-corporate moral equation 
would not shift in a decisive way until World War I. 
While proprietorships and corporations were each capitalistic, they dif-
fered fundamentally in one key dimension. Corporations had been granted 
under state law unlimited liability for the losses they incurred; proprietor-
ships had not. Since the wealth of almost every merchant was tied up in his 
business, this meant that, should he fail-as thousands would during the 
Panic of 1893-he was ruined.6 
The vulnerability of merchants to financial collapse best explains why the 
antimonopoly movement found such a sympathetic reception in the press. lt 
was not outsiders, but insiders, who fanned the flames. The corporations that 
New York City antimonopolists inveighed against with the greatest fervor in 
the 1880s were localized in one of three sectors: transportation (the New 
York & Hudson River Railroad), communications (Western Union), and 
energy (Standard Oil). Each threatened the economic interests of the city's 
merchants, though in different ways. The New York & Hudson Railroad and 
Western Union had it in their power to alter the terms of trade, cutting the 
merchants' margins to the bone. The threat posed by Standard Oil was less 
existential, though no less real: the noxious fumes that spewed forth from 
the East River refinery that it operated just north of Brooklyn fouled the air, 
imperiled property values, and undermined confidence in the self-regulating 
mechanisms of the market economy. 
) ournalists recognized the merchants' predicament and responded 
accordingly. The editorial positions of most influential big-city newspapers 
in the late nineteenth century, as in most periods of American history, re-
mained closely aligned with the country's commercial elite, which in the 
1880s continued to be dominated not by corporations, but by merchants. For 
this reason alone, it is thus not surprising that the antimonopoly movement 
found support in several of the nation's most influential newspapers, includ-
ing the Chicago Tribune and the New York World.7 
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Thurber's relationship to the antimonopoly movement is especially sug-
. gestive. For several decades prior to 1893, he had been a proprietor of Thurber, 
Whyland & Company, a large and successful Manhattan-based grocery 
wholesaler thathad acquired an enviable reputation as one of co1mtry's larg-
est importers of coffee and tea. Thurber would fail in the Panic of 1893, end-
ing his business career. Financially ruined, Thurber retrained as a lawyer, 
an unusual decision in an age in which midlife career changes remained 
uncommon. 
Thurber's legal expertise provided him with the necessary credentials to 
hang out a shingle as a business lobbyist. Thurber also had an additional, 
perhaps even more important, qualification for his new job. For in the years 
prior to his bankruptcy, Thurber himself had been one of the very anti-
monopoly agitators he now cautioned the public against. The primary impe-
tus for the antimonopoly movement that he now inveighed against, Thurber 
knew well, lay neither on the farm nor in the factory. Rather, it had been the 
brainchild of big-city proprietary capitalists like himself-that is, before he 
had gone bankrupt-an inconvenient fact now that he had switched sides, 
yet one that reveals much about media politics in the 1880s, the decade in 
which the antimonopoly movement would exert its greatest influence over 
the public imagination. 
Much of the historical writing on the late nineteenth-century anti-
monopoly movement has viewed it through the lens of the Sherman.Act, 
which is unsurprising, since for much of the twentieth century this law re-
mained a cornerstone of U.S. economic policy. This essay approaches the topic 
from a different angle. Instead of treating the Sherman Act as the first chapter 
in a twentieth-century grand narrative of business challenge and government 
response, it. casts a spotlight on the world out of which this law emerged. In 
this world, the most influential actors were neither farmers nor. workers, but 
merchants and the journalists who publicized their grievances-voices often 
marginalized in standard accounts oflate nineteenth-century public life. 
Farmers and workers, to be sure, had good reason to oppose economic 
consolidation. Yet it wogld be an exaggeration to put them at the center of 
the antimonopoly movement of the 1880s. Other voices were far more influ-
ential, especially in the big-city press, which was where the movement found 
its most enduring expression. The antimonopoly movement of the 1880s 
did not begin on the periphery and move to the cent,r. On the contrary, it 
originated in the nation's commercial centers and only later migrated to 
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the agricultural hinterland.8 Many ideas and images that originated in the 
big-city press would eventually find their way into farm and labor publica-
tions. Yet it would be a mistake to overlook their metropolitan-mercantile 
pedigree. The ubiquitous "robber baron" metaphor, for example, long an an-
timonopoly rallying cry, had its roots in historical accounts of medieval 
German commerce, and was initially popularized by well-to-do East Coast 
merchants and their journalistic devotees.9 It should, similarly, come as no 
surprise that the antimonopoly rationale for government ownership of the 
telegraph had been widely discussed by merchants and journalists in the 
big-city press for several decades before it would find its way onto the Popu-
list Party platforms in 1892 and 1896.10 
Antimonopoly is easily niisunderstood. In the main. its supporters were 
neither nostalgic defenders of a small-scale, agrarian society of self-sufficient 
husbandmen, nor anticapitalistic proponents of a workers' utopia. Con-
trary to what is sometimes assumed, they did not necessarily oppose eco-
nomic consolidation. In fact, many antimonopolists deplored "cutthroat" 
competition-a presumption widely shared by the populists, as Charles Postel 
has recently demonstrated-and more than a few actually regarded the exist-
ing degree of economic consolidation as too !own The problem with giant 
organizations for these antimonopolists was not that they were too la,rge, but 
that they were too small: economic consolidation, if properly regulated, could 
foster economies of scale that could benefit the many as well as the few. At its 
core, antimonopoly was less about economics than morality: corporations 
were dangerous not because they were too big, but rather because they had 
become too powerful to operate unrestrained by law-and, in particular, too 
independent of the salutary regulatory mechanism of market competition. 
''.Antimonopoly" in the 1880s was a capacious term that could refer to one 
of three related yet distinct responses to economic consolidation. Open-
access antimonopolists derided economic consolidation as the unnatural 
by-product of political collusion and tried to reverse it; consolidationists re-
garded economic consolidation as irreversible and tried to minimize its ill 
effects; nationalists lauded economic consolidation as a :first step on the path 
toward government ownership. Each built on the worldview of the wealthy 
and powerful merchants who in the 1880s remained highly respected moral 
.arbiters with considerable influence in the press. No antimonopolist viewed 
with equanimity the possibility that the common-law proprietorship might 
one day be supplanted by the state-chartered corporation as the country's 
dominant economic institution, or, for that matter, that corporate publicists 
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one day identify big business with the country's most cherished civic 
ideals. The valorization of managerial capitalism and the idealization of"free 
··enterprise" .remained in the future. And while not all antimonopolists were 
nationalists, most regarded government ownership of certain large-scale en-
terprises with relative equanimity: not until World War I, it is worth recall-
. ing, would government ownership of the railroad and the telegraph slip off 
the national political agenda.12 This essay does not chart the rise of manage-
rial capitalism, which would receive a vital impetus during the opening de-
cades of the twentieth century and would be largely complete by 1940.1' 
'Instead, it surveys how an earlier generation of Americans thought about 
monopoly, what it proposed to do about it, and why its assault upon big busi-
ness took the form that it did. 
* * * 
The oldest and in some ways the most enduring antimonopoly appeal re- · 
garded economic consolidation as the unnatural by-product of political col-
lusion. Open access was its byword, barriers to entry its bete noire. The best 
kind of regulation was competition, and if lawmakers could be persuaded 
to eliminate the restraints that impeded the free flow of commerce, market 
forces would do the rest. 
Open-access antimonopolism had broad support among wholesalers and 
shippers eager to lower prices on the movement of goods and.services. It was 
also a favorite of insurgent promoters eager to challenge entrench~d incum-
bents. It was for this reason that, not entirely implausibly, it proved appeal-
ing for a brief period in the 1870s to the notorious financier )ay Gould. Gould 
had invested in an insurgent telegraph network provider to challenge the 
incumbent, Western Union, and proclaimed himself an antimonopolist to 
rally support. Open-access antimonopolism also had many champions in the 
press-sometlmes in earnest, yet more than occasionally as a feint to bam-
boozle unwary investors.14 
The presumption that monopoly was unnatural was taken for granted 
by many critics of the railroad and the telegraph, two of the central pillars of 
the emerging corporate order. To make their case, these critics pointed to the 
raft of special privileges that Congress had bestowed on continent-spanning 
railroads, mostly in the form of generous land grants-:subsidies that critics 
then and now contended had prematurely hastened railroad expansion.15 
Further proof that the market was rigged was the consolidation in 1866 of 
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Western Union as the country's dominant telegraph network provider. 
Whether or not the telegraph market could have been credibly contested 
after 1866 is beside the point. The fact remains that, in the thirty-six-year 
period between the opening of the first fee-for-service telegraph line in April 
1845 and the takeover of Western Union by financier Jay Gould in January 
1881, many of Western Union's critics assumed that the telegraph market 
would have been open to new entrants had Western Union not unfairly 
lobbied Congress and manipulated the press.16 
Among the many journalists to find open access compelling was Frank 
Bellew, a talented illustrator who is best remembered today as one of the first 
cartoonists to render the American folk icon "Uncle Sam" in visual form.17 
The special privileges that lawmakers had lavished on the railroad, Bellew 
maintained in a series of hard-hitting front-page antimonopolycartoons that 
ran in the New York Daily.Graphic in the 1870s, were a direct assault on 
everything the country stood for. 
While the Daily Graphic is largely forgotten today, it had the distinction 
of being the first daily newspaper in the United States to run illustrations in 
every issue, an innovation that.obliged its editors to search far and wide for 
suitable content. The ancestor of the modern tabloid, it appealed primarily 
to novelty-seeking New Yorkers, who were joined by a sprinkling of curious 
outsiders who subscribed to a weekly edition that they received in the mail. 
In their quest for new material, the Daily Graphic's illustrators invented 
much of the visual iconography that would later become a ubiquitous feature 
of the popular press. Its cartoons were, quite literally, cartoonish: vivid, hard-
hitting, and unsubtle, they helped establish a gallery of viscerally appealing 
archetypes-the "octopus," the "robber baron," "the politico"-that would 
long remain a fixture in the iconography of political reform.18 
It is, of course, hard to know how many Americans saw Bellew's anti-
monopoly cartoons, let alone how they reacted. Yet there can be no question 
but that the iconography that he pioneered would be refined and elaborated 
by his successors for many decades, before it would be repurposed as a 
teaching tool in the U.S. history classroom at both high school and college 
levels-and also, most recently, as an educational resource on the web.19 
The most arresting of Bellew's antimonopoly cartoons built on the 
. conceit that the manipulation of the political process by corporate lobby: 
ists had transmogrified the railroad-exhibit A of the perils of economic 
consolidation-into a rampaging monster. Emboldened by its nefarious leg-
islative triumphs, the railroad-monster set its sights on the levers of power. 
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The monster Bellew had in mind had a distinctly European, high-culture 
··p~d.igree. This should come as no surprise: few antimonopoly icons were 
.born in the United States. Bellew was'an English immigrant, and, prior to 
:his arrival in the United States, had served an apprenticeship in London 
drawing satirical sketches for the English comic magazine Punch. When 
':Bel.lew depicted the railroad as an octopus, for example-a convention that 
· h0;may well have invented-he drew for inspiration on Victor Hugo's 1866 
: 11ovel Toilers of the Sea. Bellew's monster, like Hugo's, ensnared an innocent 
;;p.erson in its tentacles. For Hugo, the victim was a fisherman; for Bellew, a 
· ·yourg woman who symbolized "Columbia," a personification of the republic's 
' civic ideals. Wrapped in the American flag, Columbia struggled to keep the 
.':: .Constitution out of the clutches of the voracious monster, which had already 
. devoured "congressional honor" (Figure 1.1).20 
. The most celebrated of Bellew's antimonopoly cartoons took its inspira-
tion from another literary monster, the malformed giant in Mary Shelley's 
. ··Frankenstein (1818). For Bellew, the railroad became the vicious creature that 
· .. Shelley's mad scientist brought to life. In the earliest ofBellew's Frankenstein-
inspired cartoons, the mad scientist, outfitted as Uncle Sam, looked on in 
horror as the smoke-belching railroad-monster-nourished at the trough of 
"public lands" and trussed with a belt marked "R.R. monopoly" -sprang to 
life, crumpling the Constitution in his metallic hand.21 In a later and better-
. known version of this cartoon, the railroad-monster, having escaped from 
the scientist's laboratory, terrorized. a prostrate country. In one hand the 
monster wielded a club marked "capital"; in the other, he_wave.d aloft the torn 
mantle of"judicial ermine.'' "Agriculture, Commerce and Manufacture Are 
All in My Power," the monster exulted, adding ominously that his ultimate 
.. "Interest" was the "Higher Law of American Politics."22 
High-culture iconography also featured prominently in Bellew's "Mod-
ern Laocoon,'' another railroad-monster antimonopoly cartoon that drew 
its inspiration from European art. In this cartoon, Bellew reinterpreted the 
·celebrated classical sculpture of the doomed Trojan prophet Laocoon by 
casting the prophet as "Agriculture," his two sons as "Manufacturing" and 
"Commerce," and the death-dealing snake that strangled them the "Railroad 
Monopoly."23 
Open-access antimonopolism presumed that-in the absence of some 
. kind of unfair, immoral, or even illegal special privilege-economic consoli-
dation would be significantly forestalled. While not necessarily noninter-
ventibnist, it had certain .affinities .with the classical nineteenth-century 
) 
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'i.lilberal doctrine that its detractors would stigmatize as "laissez-faire." Each 
faith in market forces than lawmakers and each feared the 
'pi:open:;ity of regulatory initiatives to strengthen incumbents and weaken 
ui1su1rg<,nts. Its most celebrated journalistic monument was Ida M. Tarbell's 
"sea.rir1g expose of John D. Rockefeller's Standard. Oil Company, which she 
serialized in McClute's Magazine beginning in 1902 and published as a book 
years later. Tarbell's father had been an independent oilman, and, like 
the pre-1881 critics of Western Union, Tarbell took it for granted that, had 
Rockefeller not been a beneficiary of speci;u privilege,. a salutary competition 
·would have prevailed. To illustrate her thesis, Tarbell described in numbing 
detail the inner history of a thirty-year-old intra-industry set-to involving 
railroad rebates that she had learned about from her father and r'eiid about 
in the press.24 
The open-access antimonopolism of Bellew and Tarbell was long on 
moralism and short on practicality. A related, yet in some ways markedly' 
different; response to economic consolidation treated the rise of big business 
as inevitable and advocated permanent government regulation to align the 
emerging corporate order with the public good. 
· Am.ong the most celebrated of the consolidationists were the journalists 
Henry George and Henry Demarest Lloyd. Though each had a well-deserved 
reputation as a radical, neither was an outsider to the world of proprietary 
capitalism. Both were urbanites who spent much of their .adult lives in big 
cities-New York City for George, Chicago for Lloyd-and each spent many . 
years reporting for big-city newspapers on the challenges that proprietary 
capitalists confronted in a world in which they remained a powerful politi-
cal bloc. 
Henry George's antimonopolism grew directly out of his firsthand 
experience as a journalist at a San Francisco daily. To try to obtain for his 
newspaper a telegraphic news feed, George journeyed in 1869 to New York 
City-the same year in which the transcontinental railroad had been com-
pleted. Following an unsuccessful meeting at Western Union headquarters, 
George concluded, correctly, that the news feed would not be forthcoming 
. because Western Union had entered into a collusive relationship with the 
country's most important news broker, the New York Associated Press. This 
discovery led George to an epiphany that would give shape to his life's work. 
Technological innovation, George now understood, could be a curse as well 
as a blessing-or, as he put it, "progress" for .the few could coexist with "pov: 
erty" for the many. Having reached this sobering conclusion, George turned 
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his attention to the injustice of private land ownership, a monopoly that he 
regarded as even more pernicious than the collusive relationship between 
Western Union and the Associated Press.25 
Lloyd's antimonopolism, like Henry George's, was nurtured during his 
years as a big-city newspaper journalist. George discovered his life's work 
in a single blinding flash; for Lloyd, in contrast, his ideas evolved gradually 
as he climbed the journalistic ladder. Starting out as literary editor for the 
Chicago Tribune, Lloyd rose through the ranks to become financial editor and 
then chief editorial writer. Following a quarrel with one of the newspaper's 
owners-who, as it happens, was Lloyd's father-in-law-he left the paper 
to become a freelancer. Lloyd lived well. Having learned a good deal about 
Chicago real estate during his years as a journalist, he astutely parlayed 
this knowledge into a substantial fortune. In making the case against mono-
poly power, Lloyd combined firsthand reporting with analytical insights 
gleaned from state-of-the-art European social science. As a journalist, Lloyd 
reported dutifully on political scandals, legal entanglements, and legislative 
infighting-setting the pattern for much of the antimonopoly journalism 
to follow. As a social-science popularizer, he built on the Victorian reas-
sessment of the classical economics of Adam Smith. Tue fruits of Lloyd's 
labors appeared in countless newspaper and magazine articles, as well as i:D: 
his masterpiece, Wealth Against Commonwealth (1894), an impassioned 
expose of the business practices of)ohn D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil. 
Like ·Ida M. Tarbell, who had drawn extensively on Lloyd's reporting in 
her Standard Oil expose, Lloyd found much to deplore. Yet unlike Tarbell, 
Lloyd regarded economic consolidation not as a perverse aberration, but 
rather as an irreversible social fact. By documenting the rise of the corporate 
order, Lloyd hoped to hasten the day when Americans would "save the liber-
ties they have inherited" by "winning new ones to bequeath": "Monopoly is 
business at the end of its journey. It has got there. Tue irrepressible conflict 
is now as distinctly with business as the issue so lately met was with slav-
ery."26 Lloyd's task was to craft a narrative so compelling that it would raise 
the consciousness of his readers to such a pitch that they, too, would share 
· his moral indignation at the injustice that he had revealed: "When it comes 
to know the facts the human heart can no more endure monopoly than 
American slavery or Roman empire. Tue first step to a remedy is that the. 
people care. If they know, they will care. To help them to know and care; to 
stimulate new hatred of evil, new love of the good, new sympathy for the 
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victiills of power; and, by enlarging its science, to quicken the old into a new 
conscience, this compilation of fact has been made.''27 
The crux of Lloyd's argument was not economic but moral. Lloyd is justly 
· remembered today as his generation's leading journalistic popularizer of 
social scientific ideas. Tue fact-value distinction was not among them. That 
"science" was the "substance» of the word "conscience" was no mere "verbal 
accident," Lloyd reminded his readers in the closing paragraph of Wealth 
Against Commonwealth: "We must know the right before we can do the 
right."28 Monopoly was objectionable-like slavery-not because it was 
economically inefficient, but because it was morally pernicious. Its evils 
had nothing to do with size: mere bigness was not bad. If anything, the vast 
organizations that dominated the transportation and communications sec~ 
tors rested on a foundation that was unnecessarily narrow. 
The ultimate source of the moral iniquity of monopoly lay in the baleful 
moral philosophy of which it was the consummate expression. The wide-
spread embrace of the ethically threadbare utilitarianism of the English 
moral philosopher Jeremy Bentham-who had the temerity to proclaim the 
tired shibboleth "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" to be a wor-
thy civic ideal-had led, in an age of rapid technological innovation, to the 
accumulation of vast reservoirs of unregulated power by the supremely self-
ish individuals who ran the nation's corporations.29 To respond, as many 
antimonopolists did, that the challenge of utilitarianism could be met by 
harnessing self-interest to the public good through the enactment oflegisla-
tion establishing regulatory agencies to constrain self-interest, was an 
unrealistic "dream": "It is to accept the principle of the sovereignty of the 
self-interest of the :individual and.apply constitutional checks to it."30 For this 
reason, Lloyd's Wealth Against Commonwealth can be read as a five-hundred-
page meditation on the "discovery" that business corrupts politics-an 
insight that is typically associated not with the late nineteenth-century 
antimonopolists, but rather with the early twentieth-century muckrakers 
whose conclusions they did so much to prefigure.31 
A devout Christian Sbcialist, Lloyd urged Americans to renounce self-
interest and embrace the "greatest happiness of all."32 To reach the promised 
land, Lloyd looked to the past. In his search for templates for the good soci-
ety, Lloyd commended two of the nation's oldest. and most venerable institu-
tions: the public school and the Post Office Department. While e>bviously 
different) each of these institutions shared a common DNA· rooted in a civic 
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mandate that transcended the utilitarian pursuit of self-interest: "We are 
to apply the co-operative methods of the post-office and the public school to 
many other common toils, to all toils in which private sovereignty has be-
come through monopoly a despotism over the public, and to all in which the 
association of the people and the orianization of processes have been so far 
developed that the profit-hunting Captain ofindustry may be replaced by the 
public-serving Captain oflndustry."33 
Journalists provided the antimonopoly movement with its most 
enduring literary testaments: Henry George's Progress and Poverty (1879), 
Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward (1888), and Lloyd's Wealth Against 
Commonwealth (1894). Yet antimonopolywas by no means confined to the 
press. Among its nonjournalistic champions were the legion of wholesalers 
and shippers who relied on the railroad and the telegraph to buy and sell. 
Merchants had nothing against wealth. Yet they resented the accumulation 
of vast fortunes by corporate moguls who were seemingly unconstrained by 
market forces. 
Among the most earnest of the merchant antimonopolists was Francis B. 
Thurber, the same individual who, following his bankruptcy, would rail 
against the antimonopolists for their supposed indifference to the iron laws 
of economics. Thurber was not a deep thinker, and his antimonopolism 
lacked subtlety. Even so, it was not without a certain unassailable cogency. 
Recent improvements in the forces of production, Thurber believed, of which 
the most important were the railroad and the telegraph, had enormously 
increased the ability of certain powerful men to perform useful labor. Un-
fortunately, the fruits of innovation remained inaccessible to the rest of 
the population, having been monopolized by soulless corporations whose · 
owners reaped vast profits by manipulating the terms of trade. To remedy 
this evil, civic~minded citizens such as Thurber had an obligation to bring 
it to the attention of the middle and upper classes, since, in his. view, the 
injustices that the railroad and telegraph were daily perpetrating were too 
abstract and arcane to be fully appreciated by the poor.34 To assume that the 
lower orders could fully comprehend the full magnitude of the depredations 
that were being wrought by railroad and telegraph corporations defied com-
mon.sense. After all, or so Thurber sanctimoniously assumed, only a cosmo-
politan merchant like Thurber himself could possibly understand how the 
system really worked. 
Thurber embraced the nineteenth-century liberal commonplace that 
human labor was the ultimate source of value. Yet he readily conceded that 
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recent technological innovations had fund,amentally altered the relationship 
between work, power, and wealth. With the advent of steam power, a new, 
nonhuman agency had unexpectedly become the world's greatest labor saver, 
making it the "greatest creator of wealth in existence." The harnessing of 
· electricity raised an analogous conundrum: could the energy generated by 
steam and electricity be privately owned? Thurber's answer was an emphatic 
no. Human beings had the right to own their own labor, but not the energy 
generated by steam or electricity. This was because these new fOrms of power 
were gifts from God: "Like light, or air, or water, they are God's gifts to the 
human race, and should be possessed and enjoyed by everyone." Tragically, 
however, the "great middle class" had been largely shut off from the benefits 
of this new form of power, while the poor found themselves confronted for 
the first time by employers who, having harnessed the power of steam and 
electricity, had become "independent" of their exertions.35 
To draw public attention to the injustices that were being daily perpe-
trated by the railroad and the telegraph, Thurber organized the National 
Anti-Monopoly League in 1881. The immediate catalyst for its establishment 
was the frustration of an influential cohort ·of New York City-based mer-
chants at the reluctance of Republican state lawmakers to establish a state 
railroad commission. Though the league aspired to be a "national" organi- · 
za.tion, it was in fact headquartered in New York City, and during its brief 
heyday in the 1880s remained a mouthpiece for the city's proprietary capi-
talists, who, in this period, counted among their ranks some of the city's 
wealthiest and most highly respected men. Farmers played no role in the 
league's founding, and workers were important only as an audience for its 
appeals. Instead, the league was a publicity machine that had been organized 
by some of the city's wealthiest merchants to win votes and build a political 
constituency to regulate the emerging corporate order. 
The league attained one. of its primary goals in 1882 when the New York 
state legislature established a railroad commission. Flush with victory, its 
organizers broadened their agenda to embrace the monopoly question in 
all of its dimensions. To get their message across, they turned to the press. 
How else would it be possible to persuade a broad cross section of the elec-
torate of the daily injustices that were .being perpetuated by corporations? 
Central to the league-sponsored media campaign was the launching in 
1882 of Justice, a weekly newspaper devoted to ''.Anti-Monopoly Principles" 
from the standpoint of the "Rights of the Many as Against the Privileges for 
the Few."36 
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In the next few years, Justice ran hundreds of fact-studded articles detail-
ing corporate abuses, which it supplemented with a sprinkling of antimo-
nopoly cartoons. Among these cartoons was yet another by Frank Bellew. 
Dubbed "Comparative Bigness" in the explanatory article that accompanied 
it in the magazine in which it originally appeared, Bellew's cartoon was re-
titled "Upon What Meat" by the editors of Justice, a high-toned reference to 
a line from Shakespeare's "Julius Caesar." In this cartoon, which occupied the 
entire top right column of the newspaper's first page, Bellew compared 
the "relative proportions" of railroad tycoon William H. Vanderbilt, who at the 
time was worth $100 million, with that of a wealthy man worth $1 million-an 
impressive total even for the most successful proprietary capitalist-and a 
worker, defined as "small capital and labor," who made ten dollars a week. 
'J;o make this comparison visually arresting, Bellew hit upon an ingenious 
conceit: he portrayed Vanderbilt, the millionaire, and the worker as if their 
wealth were proportional to their height. In such a rendering, Vanderbilt 
filled the newspaper's column from top to bottom, the millionaire was over-
shadowed by Vanderbilt's shoe, and the worker was buried at the bottom of 
an enormous pit so deep that the full length of its shaft could not be fully 
displayed on the page.37 "Is it any wonder," the editor added, with a palpa-
ble sense of frustration at the indifference of his readership toward the injus-
tice that Bellew had depicted, "that the people stand evils without general 
protest even, that the great man has a supreme contempt for them and says, 
'The public be damned?'" (Figure 1.2.)38 
It is hard to know how many articles Thurber himself may have contrib-
uted to Justice, or even if he wrote for it at all. Most Justice articles were un' 
signed, and many appear to have been recycled from other publications. Yet 
there can no doubt that Thurber fully shared Bellew's outrage at economic 
inequality, and, in particular, the rapidly growing wealth gap between the 
rich and poor. We are "fast becoming a nation of millionaires and tramps," 
Thurber declared in a public address on "Democracy and Anti-Monopoly" 
that he delivered in 1883. Such an inegalitarian, class-divided society was 
most emphatically not what the founders of the republic had had in mind 
when they had tried to level the playing field for future generations by abol-
ishing primogeniture and entail: "Could they have foreseen the invention 
of steam and electricity and the consequent enormous development and 
power of corporate life, can it be doubted that they would have placed ade-
quate checks and limitations thereto?'"' 
Figure 1.2. The enormous 
wealth gap between railroad 
magnate William H. 
Vanderbilt and the rest of 
the population furnished 
the theme for this ingenious 
Frank Bellew antimonopoly 
cartoon, entitled 
"Comparative Bigness," in 
an accompanyi!1g article by 
the editors of the comic 
magazine in which it 
'originally appeared. By 
translating wealth into 
height, Bellew depicted 
Vanderbilt-whose personal 
wealth in 1882 hovered 
around $100 million-as an 
overgrown giant who 
towered over not only 
o.i"dinaryworkers-who, 
crushed by corporate 
rapacity, were rapidly being 
suffocated in a pit much too 
deep to be visually rendered 
on the printed page-but 
also the ordinary 
millionaire, a midget 
dwarfed in height by 
Vanderbilt's right foot. 
Canard, October 28, 
1882, p. 4. Collection 
of the New York Historical 
Society. 
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Thurber aimed his barbs not only at corporations, but also at the corrupt · 
and corrupting influence of corporate-based financial speculation on the 
press. Like many New Yorkers who read the newspapers or perused Puck's 
gallery of antimonopoly cartoons, Thurber was deeply troubled by the qual-
ity of the financial information upon which every merchant relied. Every 
well-informed New Yorker understood that speculative high-flyers like Jay 
Gould routinely planted fake news stories in big-city newspapers that had 
been designed to trick gullible investors into making foolish investment 
decisions.40 It was by no means unheard of, Lloyd sardonically reported in 
Wealth Against Commonwealth, for corporate lobbyists to persuade journal-
ists to intentionally misreport antimonopoly speeches.41 In such a house of 
mirrors, Thurber believed, it had become a civic obligation for right-thinking 
Americans to help subsidize an independent newspaper like Justice. "Subscribe 
for Justice"-or so ran a solicitation that appeared frequently in its pages-"a 
Paper whose Opinions are Not for Sale."42 
Thurber shared Lloyd's conviction that the perils of monopoly were bet-
ter understood by the few than the many, and, thus, that insiders like him-
self had a special obligation to publicize the immorality ofbusiness practices 
that the many were regrettably prone to ignore: «The masses do not appreci-
ate how great, many and dangerous have been the attacks made by corporate 
monopolies upon our free institutions. Time will not permit me to enumer-
ate many of them, but the following ... "43 
The "checks and limitations" on corporate power that Thurber envisioned 
were regulatory. Confident that lawmakers could set matters right, Thurb~r 
had little patience with Lloyd's conviction that government regulation was 
futile, since it would inevitably become a tool for the few. If the "centraliza-
tion" of power could be checked, Thurber favored local control. Yet that time 
had passed: "I am opposed to the centralization of power either in the hands 
of Government or of corporations, but centralization is a fact staring us in 
the face and we must see if we cannot make one form of centralization neu-
tralize the other."44 The only alternative to the countervailing power of gov-
ernment regulation, Thurber declared, was an "anarchy" dominated by men 
. whose "individuality" had become so submerged in a "corporate organiza-
tion" that it had rendered them "as hard as steel, as pitiless as the storm."45 
Antimonopolists like Thurber and Lloyd spilled a great deal of ink in the 
1880s on the perils of economic consolidation. In pamphlet after pamphlet, 
newspaper article after newspaper article 1 a~d government investigation 
after government investigation (mostly at the state level), they mounted a 
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· · searing assault on the corrupt and corrupting business practices that would 
_long echo and reecho in the press. Their illdictment was fact-laden, indig-
nant, and morally charged. They aspired not only to change minds, but also 
to open hearts. Corporate magnates like William H. Vanderbilt, Jay Gould, 
and John D. Rockefeller had not only clogged the channels of trade; they 
were conspiring to destroy the republic.46 
Cartoonists proved adept at translating the antimonopoly appeal into 
a visually arresting form. The disclosure that Standard Oil had colluded 
with the railroads to cut costs might not stir the blood. Yet if the oil refiner 
were transmogrified into an octopus, it became much easier to render ~egi­
ble the consequences of phenomena that were otherwise not easily grasped.47 
The ecological devastation wrought by Standard Oil's archipelago of big-city 
refineries was an especially compelling target. After all, the link between its 
business practices and the noxious fumes that belched forth from its East 
River refinery just north of Brooklyn was plain for all to see-or, more pre-
. dsely, to smell. Standard Oil was a "horrible monster," screamed the caption 
of a haunting antimonopoly cartoon illustrating these hazards that ran in 
the Daily Graphic in 1880 (Figure 1.3).48 
The oil-refinery monster conceit was reminiscent of, and was very Prob-; 
ably indebted to, the railroad-monsters that Frank Bellew had drawn for the 
Daily Graphic. Yet its victims were different. No longer had the corporation 
set its sights on the government, as had Bellew's railroad-monster. Rather, its 
victim was the multitude of urbanites-including many who the cartoonist 
plainly depicted as well-to-do-whose air had been poisoned by the foul 
odors emanating daily from Standard Oil's refinery, a hazard that the car-
toonist rendered visually arresting by depicting the source of the malodor-
ous stinkthat was spreading "poverty, death, and disease" as the outstretched 
"tentacles" of the oil refinery-monster insidiously extended its reach.49 
The iconography of antimonopoly entered a new and more expansive 
phase following Jay Gould's takeover of Western Union in January 1881. No-
where was this ;;,ore evident than in the New York City-based humor mag-
azines Puck and Judge. Like the Daily Graphic, these magazines appealed 
to an upscale audience of worldly New Yorkers who reveled in their inside-
dopester political satire and admired the multicolor chromolithographs that . 
were featured in every issue. 
For Joseph Keppler, one of the ablest cartoonists of this or any age, 
Gould's takeover provided the inspiration for a gallery of stunning antimo-
nopoly cartoons. The first, which appeared within days of Gould's takeover, 
/\. llOll!l(llJ,I: Mmi~Trm, 
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Figure 1.3. The ecological devastation wrought by a Standard 
Oil refinery jus't north of Brooklyn inspired this haunting 
antimonopoly cartoon, in which the corporation became a 
"horrible monster" whose tentacles had become noxious fumes 
that polluted the air, fouled middle-class parlors, and render~d 
genteel waterside villas uninhabitable. In contrast to Frank 
Bellew's railroad-monster, the oil refinery-monster had fixed its 
tentacles not on the government but on the environment. 
"Hooper," ''A Horrible Monster," Daily Graphic, 
July 19, 1880. 
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'\'{as entitled, fittingly enough, "Consolidated." In the background, telegraph 
(J10l•es bearing the names of telegraph companies that Gould had recently ac-
quired stretched across the land. In the foreground, a gleeful Gould perched 
comfortably on a playground swing (the "telegraph monopoly") tethered by 
telegraph wire to statues representing "commerce" and "the press." As Gould 
glided back and forth, the wires. tightened around the statues' necks, stran-
gling them to death.50 
The republic was "In Danger," screamed the caption for another Keppler 
cartoon that ran in Puck the following month. This time the threat lay in the 
corrupt nexus of lawmakers and business interests that Keppler depicted as 
a snake (labeled "monopoly") that had slithered out of the Capitol, whose al-
ternating stripes bore the names oflawmakers and corporations ("Standard 
Oil," «Pennsylvania Central Railroad") as well as notorious corruption scan-
dals (''.Alaska"). The intended victim of this corrupt nexus-monster was, as it 
had been so often for Bellew, the country's vaunted civic ideals, as personi-
fied by a flag-clad matron whose Phrygian cap, a venerable symbol of free-
dom, bore the word "Liberty" across its front. Whether or not the republic 
could be saved remained an open question. "What are you going to do about 
it?" Puck's mascot asked Uncle Sam, whom Keppler rendered as a kindly yet 
ineffectual bystander who had yet to make up his mind to take a decisive 
stand against corri1ption. si 
For cartoonists1 the answer to the mascot's question depended on one's 
politics. For Keppler, publicity held the key. Keppler's cartoon "The Monster 
Monopoly" made this point with particular force. Once again, the grasping 
corporation took the form of a creature from the deep. This time, however, 
the monster was not an octopus, but a whale. The whale-which sported 
Gould's face on its head, and the faces of Gould's collaborators William H. 
Vanderbilt and Cyrus Field on its tail fins-spouted "monopoly" as it flipped 
its tail fins to upend a flimsy rowboat ("business"). To the rescue came the 
press in a sti:trdy little craft (the "Dauntless") manned by skillful rowers 
whom the cartoonist identified as "editors." At the helm of the skiff stood 
Puck's mascot, poised to plunge a harpoon (whose tip bore the talismanic 
word "antimonopoly") into the whale's side-" 
Other cartoonists lacked Keppler's confidence in the power of the press. 
Antimonopolists were .in a «Perplexing Position," brooded one Puck cartoon-
ist in late 1881. Now that antimonopoly had gained the endorsement of 
New York City's corrupt Democratic political machine, Tanimany Hall, it was 
hard for men of good faith-personified here by the magazin!''s mascot-to 
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choose between the "Monopolyville" of Vanderbilt and Field, and the 
"Anti-Monopolyville" of Tammany boss John Kelly. Kelly, an opportunis-
tic antimonopolist, held aloft the banner "Down with the Bloated Monop-
olists" to cynically garner votes while sidelining sincere antimonopolists 
like Thurber-who was, quite literally, in Kelly's back pocket.53 Here the car-
toonist raised a challenging question that later historians would long de-
bate: Had merchant antimonopolists like Thurber successfully co-opted the 
Democratic Party-with .its large working-class constituency-or was it the 
other way around? 
The only antimonopoly cartoonist who could rival Bellew and Kep-
pler in sheer inventiveness was G. Frederick Keller. Unlike Bellew and 
Keppler, Keller rose to prominence not in New York City, but in San Fran-
cisco, where, for a few years in the 1880s, he published an arresting portfolio 
of antimonopoly cartoons for the satirical magazine Wasp-the West Coast 
equivalent ofKeppler's Puck.54 
Antimonopolists differed on many issues of strategy and tactics, yet on 
one point consensus prevailed. The wellspring of the, antimonopoly move-
ment lay not in the hinterland, but in the nation's largest cities-and, in 
particular, in New York, Brooklyn, Chicago, and San Francisco-while its 
earliest and most influential champions were neither farmers nor w9rkers, 
but proprietary capitalists and the journalists who covered their beat. In-
deed, it would be hard to point to a single antimonopoly theme that would 
be championed in the 1890s and beyond by a farm or labor leader that had 
not appeared before 1880 in a big-city newspaper or magazine. If New York 
City was a "monied metropolis" in which merchants and manufacturers 
formed a durable alliance, as one historian has claimed, then it was also an 
antimonopoly metropolis in which proprietary capitalists collaborated with 
journalists to expose the abuses of the emerging corporate order. 
The vocabulary of antimonopoly was urbane and sophisticated, as one 
might have anticipated, rooted as it was in the moral philosophy of the 
eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment and the political economy of 
mid-nineteenth-century British and Continental social science. So too was 
its visual iconography. Bellew had been born in British India, and drew much 
of his inspiration from the London comic magazine Punch, to which he 
occasionally contributed. Keppler, in turn, hailed from Vienna, and would 
deploy to good advantage in Puck compositional techniques that he had 
absorbed from the Baroque architecture, sculpture, and painting of the 
Hapsburg Empire that he remembered from his youth. 
Figure 1.4. "The Best Kind of Monopoly," ran the caption for this hopeful 1882 
James A. Wales antimonopoly cartoon endorsing the absorption of the telegraph 
by the Post Office Department. "Let the People's Government Supply the People's 
Information," the caption proclaimed, articulating a civic ideal t~at appealed to 
East Coast proprietary capitalists and that would soon be picked up by populists 
in the South and West. James A. Wales, "The Best Kind of Monopoly," Judge 2 
(October 7, 1882): 1. 
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The urban pedigree of the antimonopoly movement was particularly 
conspicuous in its third, nationalist variant. Having accepted the inevitabil-
ity of economic consolidation, nationalist antimonopolists took the further 
step of endorsing government ownership. 
Government ownership today is often looked upon as a bizarre and 
foreign idea alien to the country's supposedly antistatist past. In fact, it 
has a distinguished American pedigree. For many late nineteenth-century 
antimonopolists, including Lloyd and Edward Bellamy, the much-touted 
success of the Post Office Department silenced any doubts regarding its 
practicality. For many Americam in the 1880s, 1890s, and 1900s-and not 
just for socialists, radicals, and Bellamyite nationalists-government owner-
ship seemed far more compelling than corporate control. It was, after all, an 
age in which many Americans defended the public over theprivate, and not 
just for nationwide combines such as Western Union, but also for municipal 
franchise corporations with a mandate to provide the entire population-
and not just that segment of the population who had tlie ability to pay-with 
gas, water, public transportation, and even telephone service.55 
The relative equanimity with which Americans contemplated govern-
ment ownership owed much to the antimonopoly appeal. For the antimonop-
oly cartoonist, the corporation was invariably a malign and often frightening 
monster. The republic's civic ideals, in contrast, were typically personified 
as a gracious and ingratiating, if often somewhat ineffectual, Uncle Sam. 
Government ownership was the "Best Kind of Monopoly," declared cartoonist 
James A. Wales in a forthright endorsement of the congressional buyout of 
the telegraph network that ran in the resolutely establishmentarian humor 
magazine Judge in October 1882. To illustrate this theme, Wales depicted an 
unusually resolute Uncle Sam wrestling a telegraph pole out of Jay Gould's 
hands and confidently striding out of the "den of the wrecker monopolists" 
and, to Gould's immense chagrin, across the river of watered stock that the 
"wrecker" could not ford and on to its future home in the Post Office Depart-
. men!. Like a latter-day Moses, Wales's Uncle Sam had led his people out of 
Egypt, across a river that their tormentor could not cross, and toward the 
promised land. The moral was unmistakable: government ownership was the 
solution to the problem that corporation-enabled speculative finance had 
spawned. Lest some dimwitted subscriber miss the point, Wales's caption 
spelled it out: "Let the People's Government Supply the People's Information" 
(Figure 1.4).56 
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The specter of corruption provided antimonopoly cartoonists with a 
.weai<u1 of material. The trick was to render this danger visually compelling. 
To help convince his audience that the republic was truly "In Danger," Kep-
depicted the corrupi nexus of lawmakers and business interests as a 
: slithE:rinLg snake ("monopoly") that had wrapped itself around the congres-
sional dome.57 The specter of corruption would, be rendered even more 
compellingly a few years later in Keppler's "Bosses of the Senate," in which 
a phalanx of overfed lobbyists for different monopolies (the "Standard Oil 
Trust," the "Sugar Trust," the "Copper Trust") ha_d shut the public out of the 
legislative chamber. 58 
Equally artful was Grant E. Hamilton's "In the Clutch of a Grasping 
. Monopoly," an 1888 slap_ at the nation's largest telephone company, in which 
the "Bell Telephone Monopoly" became a grasping spider angling to entrap 
the federal legislature in its web.59 The corporation-monster hybrid reached 
. something of an apotheosis in 1904, when Keppler's son, Joseph )r.,-who, 
like his father, was a cartoonist for Puck-updated the by-then venerable ren-
dering of the monopoly as an octopus to accuse the Standard Oil Company 
of trying to corrupt the presidency. Jn Joseph )r.'s, rendering, the Standard 
Oil octopus had already wrapped its tentacles around the state legislatures 
and Congress, and had set its sights-"Next!"-on the ultimate prize: Theo-
dore Roosevelt's White House.60 As if to answer Keppler's implicit question, 
one of his colleagues reassuringly responded the following year with news 
that the "Standard Oil Serpents" of Rockefeller and Henry H. Rogers had 
not overmastered Roosevelt (the "Infant Hercules"), but, instead, that the 
youthful president was successfully wrestling them to the ground.61 . 
* * * 
This essay has traced the popularization in the 1880s of an antimonopoly 
critique of corp.orate capital that had been crafted by proprietary capitalists 
in conjunction with their journalistic admirers. The central role played in the 
antimonopoly movement by these groups, rather than by farmers and work-
ers, has long been obscured by the mistaken assumption that late nineteenth-
century politics revolved around a contest between the people and the 
interests, with the interests being more or less congruent with business. In 
fact, the antimonopolists regarded the interests of the people and the inter-
ests of proprietary capitalists to be fundamentally aligned. For them, the 
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primary fault line was not the people versus business, as a later generation of 
progressives would contend. Rather, it was business versus monopoly, a very 
different configuration that aligned business with the people and both 
against monopoly. This distinction will remain obscure so long as historians 
continue to view the period through a Manichean people-versus-the-interests 
lens. "Monopoly is not business/' explained an editorialist in a New York 
City periodical in 1884, in a particularly pithy distillation of the conven-
tional wisdom. ·On the contrary, monopol)r "kills business," an accusation 
that antirnonopolists made repeatedly not only in stirring prose but also in 
the stunning visual iconography that remains one of the movement's most 
enduring legacies. 62 
The pivotal role of proprietary capitalists in the enactment of late 
nineteentJ:l_-century regulatory legislation is well known. New York City mer-
chants drafted key provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, and 
shippers rather than farmers led the fight for the establishment of state-level 
railroad commissions-a fact that has long been obscured by the u;,critical 
adoption by historians of the once sneering dismissal by seaboard elites of 
this legislation as farmer-backed "granger laws."63 
This revisionist characterization of the antimonopoly movement rests 
not only on an analysis of the divergent economic interests of proprietary 
and corporate capitalists, but also on the media politics of its critics and 
supporters. This analysis calls into question the propensity of historians to 
characterize the media politics of the period as tawdry and superficial, the 
rise of the corporate order as uncontested, and the progress of economic 
consolidation as unchallenged. Only in history books did antimonopoly . 
bubble up more or less organically from the agricultural hinterland, with 
. little .or no input from proprietary capitalists in the nation's major cities. 
The ubiquity of such a flat, one-dimensional, and fundamentally mistaken 
people-versus-the-interests story line has its origins n~t only in the wishful 
thinking of historians and the gullibility of journalists, but also, and much 
more insidiously, in the publicity campaign mounted by big-business lobby-
ists such as Francis B. Thurber. Thurber's post-1893 anti-antimonopoly 
counteroffensive had been intentionally designed to sabotage the antimo--
nopoly movement by blaming it on farmers and workers, two groups far less 
powerful-and for this reason markedly less threatening to the status quo-
than proprietary merchants. It was, in short, the mirror image of the pro-
antimonopoly campaign that Thurber himself had led in the 1880s, prior to 
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his bankruptcy, to protect the interests of proprietary capital against a 
.rising-though still morally vulnerable-corporate order. 
.. The failure of all but a' tiny handful of historians to fully grasp the 
• character and significance of the late nineteenth-century antimonopoly 
.. ' movement is a testament not only to the extent to which historians have 
.?·misunderstood the past, but also to the way the past has come to be remem-
··· bered. By ignoring the interests of proprietary capitalists and the visions 
••:. of the journalists who championed their cause, historians have provided yet 
"·• · one more reason to perpetuate the seductive, yet highly misleading, people-
vers_us-the-interests mythology that had led so many to dismiss the 1880s as 
a reactionary "Gilded Age." The recovery of these neglected voices reminds 
of the extent to which this decade deserves to be remembered-no less 
than the Progressive Era for which the antirnonopoly movement of the 1880s 
would serve as a prelude, inspiration, and goad-as an age of reform.64 
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